History

Modern Turkey & The Third Republic

In spite of the new structure, bickering, crossing of party lines, and splinter groups plagued the political machine. Confidence in the system plummeted, as did the value of the Turkish lira, resulting in unemployment, poverty, hunger, and ultimately social repression. The social and economic situation deteriorated so much so that in 1971, in what became known as the "coup by memorandum," Demirel was forced by the military to resign.

The 1970s were a reactionary time in Turkey, much as the 1960s were in the United States, with Marxist and Leninist doctrines clogging impressionable minds. It wasn't long before antigovernment organizations turned to violence in order to further their cause. The left-wing Turkish People's Liberation Army resorted to political assassinations, kidnappings, and fantastic bank robberies, while the Grey Wolves, the terrorist arm of the Islamic-minded National Salvation Party, made standing in a bus line a fatal risk. By mid-1979 the death toll attributed to terrorist violence had reached 20 people a day.

The military coup of 1980 led by army Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren was greeted with relief by the general population as well as by concerned members of NATO. Two years later, just as they did after previous coups, the military restored civilian government, although they did only offer one candidate for president: Kenan Evren.

The new government found a secure identity in the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Özal, an economist with a proven track record in economic policy. Atatürk's policy of étatism was removed in favor of private enterprise. Unfortunately, two particularly volatile situations impeded Özal from achieving significant progress in building a free market and boosting foreign trade. Tensions in the east were mounting among the Kurdish nationalists, while Turkey's involvement in the Korean War only further drained the country's resources. Expecting to have received some type of recognition or economic support for its participation in the war and having received none, the Turks reacted with violence on military facilities and a decidedly anti-American opinion.

Prior to the 1987 National Assembly elections, the bans against opposition parties and politicians were lifted, with the only restriction being that only parties with more than 10% of the national vote would gain a seat. Only three parties exceeded the 10% requirement: Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi or ANAP), which gained a meaty 36% of the vote; the Social Democratic Populist Party (or SHP, which combined the Sosyal Demokrat Parti or Sodep, with the Populist Party, or HP) led by Inönü's son Erdal; and the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi or DYP), reconstituted from the JP and headed by Demirel. Özal succeeded in making headway in areas of foreign policy and economics, despite the impediments of additional political parties and messy clusters of changing coalitions. Nevertheless, some of Turkey's nouveau riche got accustomed to the excesses of the 1980s, although not always by legitimate means. Upon Özal's death in 1993, Demirel made yet another political comeback as Turkey's seventh elected president.

Turkey ath the Turn of the 21st Century

Although Turkey has been vigilant in guarding its secularism, it has not been without a constant struggle. An increasingly corrupt government was bound to provoke resistance, and a return to traditionalism gave credibility to Islamic activity. Educational and welfare programs made possible through endowments from Saudi Arabia gave rise to religious fanaticism, reinforced in the wake of the 1979 revolution in Iran. By 1995, with pro-Islamic sentiment on the rise, the Islamic partisans, having formed the Welfare Party, had gained enough votes in the parliamentary elections to make the coalitions stand up and take notice. With Necmettin Erbakan at the helm, the Welfare Party obtained legitimacy through a coalition with the True Path party, an alliance that most factions had tried to avoid. Erbakan was appointed to serve alternating years as prime minister with the current prime minister, making him the first Islamic leader in the history of the Turkish Republic.

Erbakan's participation as prime minister was an outright affront to the 1982 constitution's prohibiting of "even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets." Erbakan was widely criticized, especially by the military, which later forced him to resign. The Welfare Party was accused of being antisecular and was banned in 1998 along with Erbakan, who was prohibited from participating in politics until 2003. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP in Turkish), formed in August 2001, took over where the Welfare Party left off, claiming a new, moderate stance and a willingness to work within the secular system. The AKP was propelled into power in 2002 with more than 34% of the vote, in no small part as a result of the ineptitude of the government in power to handle the 1999 earthquake, which claimed the lives of over 20,000. It is a well-publicized fact that much of the destruction caused by the earthquake could have been avoided had adequate building methods been employed, and that poorly constructed buildings were a result of corrupt business practices. The vote was also seen as a backlash against institutional corruption as well as dissatisfaction with the crumbling Turkish economy. Reccep Tayipp Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul whose leadership of the party was delayed as a result of incendiary remarks he had made in 1997 ("Mosques are our barracks, domes our helmets, minarets our bayonets, believers our soldiers"), has been at the helm since 2003, and apparently, the Turks are more than satisfied with his performance. In 2004, the AKP received an unprecedented 44% of the vote. And in the years since, Turkey has experienced a historic level of economic stability and progress. Erdogan has also been at the forefront of Turkey's push for full admittance into the E.U. In September 2005, E.U. member states voted to begin accession talks with Turkey, a process that will take at least a decade.

Cyprus 101

Cyprus is another one of these divisive territorial issues not entirely dissimilar to the Northern Ireland, Palestinian, or Kashmir conflicts. Situated 65km (40 miles) off the Turkish coast, Cyprus was a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, with sizable migrations of Muslim Turks adding to the Orthodox Christian Greek inhabitants of the island. The island became a British colony in 1878 in exchange for support of Turkey against Russian aggression. Anti-British terrorism by Greek Cypriots in the mid-1950s incited riots in Istanbul; Turks were fearful that Greek ownership of the island would be a threat to Turkish national security. The London agreement, negotiated by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, established the independent republic of Cyprus in 1960, with a Greek president, a Turkish vice president, and a fair proportion of representatives in the government.

This bi-communal state functioned for only 3 years, as militant Greek Cypriots (backed by Greece) ousted the Turkish Cypriot members, which resulted in a series of brutal attacks on both Greek and Turkish villages. Once again, it is a case of finger-pointing about who threw the first punch. For the next 10 years, the Turkish Cypriots lived as refugees, during which time Turkey unsuccessfully sought support from a U.S. government unwilling to intervene on behalf of either the Greeks or the Turks. A Greek coup aimed at annexing the island and aided by local Greek Cypriot forces in 1974 called Turkey to action. A Turkish expeditionary force was deployed, occupying the northern third of the island, which in 1983 proclaimed itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greek inhabitants of the northern territory fled south.

The United Nations has called for a unified state made up of two politically equal communities, and in 2005, Turkey voted yes for reunification. But the Greek Cypriots voted no. There have been no further attempts at negotiation as the international community pretty much waits for the dust to settle. Meanwhile, the United Nations still does not recognize the northern republic and UN peacekeeping forces continue to patrol the border zones between north and south. Now that the E.U. has cleared the way for accession talks with Turkey, it remains to be seen how much Cyprus will remain a thorn in the side of Turkey.

The Kurdish Question

So who are the Kurds, these people without a country? History books pinpoint their origins to western Iran, but it's more accurate to say that the Kurds have roots in many different lands. Over time, the Kurds have developed a distinctive culture, and today the Kurdish population spreads over eastern Anatolia, northeastern Iraq, Syria, and western Iran.

In the wake of World War I, Kurdish demands for an independent state were met in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), but the treaty was nullified by Atatürk's victories over foreign occupation and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). This new treaty made no mention of the Kurds. The Kurds have been struggling for independence ever since, suffering from repression not only in Turkey but in other countries in the region. In the 1980-to-1988 Iran-Iraq War, entire Kurdish villages were annihilated due to Iraq's use of poison gas; as a result the Turkish government allowed 100,000 Iraqi refugees to flow over the border into Turkey.

In 1978 Abdullah Öcalan formed the PKK as an organized separatist movement, accusing the Turkish government of oppression, repression, torture, and censorship. The Turkish government labeled the PKK a terrorist organization with a limited following intent on destabilizing the Turkish nation and threatening its sovereignty. Turkey considers its Kurdish population Turkish citizens, although in practice, many of the predominantly Kurdish territories, typically in remote regions, are impoverished and lack basic public services.

The PKK took up arms in 1984, and the violence persisted until Öcalan's capture in 1999. In the 16-year armed conflict, the Turkish government estimates that over 30,000 people lost their lives, although this estimate is probably a modest one. At the end of Öcalan's trial, the PKK leader was sentenced to death; since that time, Turkey has abolished the death penalty and Öcalan can expect to live out his days in a Turkish prison.

The PKK, now known as KONGRA-GEL (People's Congress of Kurdistan), declared an end to the cease-fire in 2003, and since then, sporadic assassinations, attacks, and counterattacks have been reported in the Southeast. But this time around, Turkey has the support of the U.S. and the international community in designating the organization as a terrorist one, leaving the Kurdish fighters with dwindling resources and increased opposition to their cause. Meanwhile, the average Kurd in Turkey is very much weary of the unnecessary killing, leaving the insurgents with fewer and fewer recruits. At the same time, the Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi or Southeast Anatolian Development Project, the massive regional sustainable development plan, promises to lift the Southeast out of poverty while integrating the Kurdish population into the Turkish national experience. For those whose livelihoods are bound to improve, the GAP is a godsend. For others, who have been displaced by the project or who have focused their lives' energies on the creation of an independent Kuristan, this is an anathema to be resisted at all cost.